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Men nearly always follow the tracks made by others and proceed in their
aairs by imitation...
| Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. 6, 1514
1 Introduction
We are inuenced by others in almost every activity, and this includes investment and
nancial transactions. For example, it is reported as news when Warren Buett buys
a stock or commodity, and this news aects its price (see Section 6). Such inuence
may be entirely rational, but investors and managers are often accused of irrationally
converging in their actions and beliefs, perhaps because of a `herd instinct,' or from a
contagious emotional response to stressful events.
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There are certainly some phenomena that are suggestive of irrational herding by
markets, such as anecdotes of market price movements without obvious justifying news;
examples that (with the benet of hindsight) look like mistakes, such as the overpricing
of U.S. technology stocks in the late 1990s; the fact that corporate actions such as new
issues and takeovers move in waves; and the tendency of analysts to be enamored with
certain sectors at dierent times. Practioners and the media discussions are much too
ready to jump from such patterns to the conclusion that irrational herding is proved. A
fully rational market may react to information that the researcher has failed to perceive;
market eÆciency does not mean perfect foresight, so we expect analyst forecasts and
market prices to be wrong ex post; and corporate actions may move in waves in rational
response to changing fundamental conditions.
There has, of course, been a great deal of serious theoretical and empirical exploration
of the proposition that irrational investor errors cause market misvaluation of assets.
This includes some exploration of whether there is contagion in biases across dierent
investor groups, or from analysts to investors; and exploration of whether rms take
actions to exploit market misvaluation (for recent reviews, see Hirshleifer (2001) and
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2002)).
However, academic research has also contributed in a dierent way to our under-
standing of these issues. Recent theoretical work on social learning and behavioral
convergence indicates that some phenomena that seem irrational can actually arise very
1
See, e.g., Business Week (1998) on \Why Investors Stampede: ... And why the potential for
damage is greater than ever," or the advertisement by Scudder Investments in Forbes (10/29/01) with
the heading, \MILLIONS of very fast, slightly MISINFORMED sheep. Now that's opportunity."
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naturally in fully rational settings. Such phenomena include: (1) frequent convergence
by individuals or rms upon mistaken actions based upon little investigation and little
justifying information; (2) the tendency for social outcomes to be fragile with respect
to seemingly small shocks; and (3) the tendency for individuals or rms to delay deci-
sion for extended periods of time and then, without obvious external trigger, suddenly
rush to act simultaneously. There has also been theoretical work on reputation-building
incentives by managers, which has focused primarily on issue (1), but which has also
oered explanations for why some managers may deviate from the herd as well.
In this paper we review both fully rational and imperfectly rational theories of be-
havioral convergence; their implications for investor trading, managerial investment and
nancing choices, analyst following and forecasts, market prices, market regulation, and
welfare; and associated empirical evidence. Learning from prices is by now familiar in
capital markets research, but we will argue here that more personal learning from quan-
tities (individual actions), from outcomes, and from conversation is also important for
markets.
We examine here behavioral convergence and uctuations in the behavior of in-
vestors, security analysts, and rms in their respective decisions. Investors may `herd'
(converge in behavior) or `cascade' (ignore their private information signals) in deciding
whether to participate in the market, what securities to trade, and whether to buy or
sell. Both analysts and investors may herd in deciding what securities to discuss and
study. Analysts may also herd in the forecasts they oer. We will consider how herding
or cascading may aect market prices. Furthermore, rms can herd in their investment
decisions, in their nancing decisions, and in their reporting decisions. For example,
rms may herd in the timing of new issues, in the adoption of fashionable investment
projects, or in their decisions of how to report earnings. Also, rms can take actions to
protect against or exploit herding and cascading by investors and analysts.
In summary, our main goals are:
1. To provide a simple taxonomy of herding, payo and reputation interactions, social
learning and cascading.
2. Review critically the strengths and limitations of the basic analytical frameworks
for understanding social learning based on observing others, and for understanding
reputation-building incentives to converge or diverge behaviorally.
3. Review the evidence from capital markets regarding herd behavior or cascades,
and evaluate how alternative theories may help explain evidence on the behavior
2
of investors, rms, and analysts. This includes consideration of both incentives for
parties to engage in herding or cascading, and the incentives for parties to protect
against or take advantage of herding or cascading by others.
Some issues omitted issues here are social learning and imitation in games (see,
e.g. Fudenberg and Kreps (1995), Gale and Rosenthal (2001)), and the vast general
literatures on social learning through prices (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz (1976)), and
on the clearing mechanisms by which trades are converted to prices (e.g., Glosten and
Milgrom (1985), Kyle (1985)).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 classies mechanisms
of learning and behavioral convergence. Section 3 describes basic principles and alter-
native economic scenarios in rational learning models Section 4 describes agency and
reputation-based herding models. Section 5 describes theory and evidence on herding
and cascades in security analysis. Section 6 describes herd behavior and cascades in
security trading. Section 7 describes the price implications of herding and cascading
and their relation to bubbles. Section 8 describes herd behavior and cascades in rms'
investment, nancing, and reporting decisions. Section 9 concludes.
2 Taxonomy and mechanisms of social learning and
behavioral convergence
An individual's thoughts, feelings and actions can be inuenced by other individuals by
several means: by words, by observation of actions (e.g., observation of quantities such
as supplies and demands), and by observation of the consequences of actions (such as
individual payos, or market prices). This inuence may involve fully rational learning,
a quasi-rational process, or even in ways that do not improve the observer's decisions at
all.
The process of social inuence can promote convergence or divergence in behavior;
Figure 1 provides a taxonomy of dierent sources of convergence or divergence. We
do not regard as convergence mere random formations with illusory appearance of sys-
tematic groupings. Our focus also excludes mere clustering, wherein people act in a
similar way owing to the parallel independent inuence of a common external factor.
Our focus is on convergence or divergence brought about by actual interactions between
individuals.
Herding/dispersing is dened to include any behavior similarity/dissimilarity brought
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about by the interaction of individuals. (Originally herding referred to physical clump-
ing, but this has been extended by economists to convergence in the action space.)
Possible sources include:
1. Payo externalities (often called network externalities or strategic complementar-
ities); for example, it pays for one person to use email if everyone else does too;
2. Sanctions upon deviants (as when dissidents in a dictatorship are jailed or tortured)
3. Preference interactions (some individuals may prefer to wear Versace this season,
just because everyone else is; others may prefer to deviate the color that is `in' this
season);
4. Direct communication (someone may simply state which of two alternatives are
better- but it is not so simple, since there is an issue of credibility),
5. Observational inuence (an individual may observe the actions of others or conse-
quences of those actions).
Figure 1 describes a double hierarchy of means of convergence. At the top of the
hierarchy is the most inclusive category, herding/dispersing. Rectangles depict the ob-
servational hierarchy (A, B, C, D), which describes the informational sources of herding
or dispersing. These include:
 A. herding/dispersing: Observation of others can lead to dispersing instead of
herding. For example, if preferences are opposing.
 B. Observational Inuence: Dependence of behavior upon the observed behavior
of others, or the results of their behavior; may be imperfectly rational.
 C. Rational Observational Learning: Observational inuence resulting from ratio-
nal Bayesian inference from information reected in the behavior of others, or the
results of their behavior.
 D. Informational Cascades: (Observational learning in which the observation of
others (their actions, payos, or even conversation) is so informative that an indi-
vidual's action does not depend on his own private signal).
The last category, informational cascades, describes a condition in which imitation
will occur with certainty. Even as simple a form of social interaction as imitation oers
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a crucial benet: it allows an individual to exploit information possessed by others
about the environment. When a friend is eeing rapidly, it may be good to run even
before seeing the saber tooth tiger chasing around the bend. The benet from imitating
others, and of taking into account the payo outcomes of others, is fundamental, as
evidenced by the observation of such behavior in many kinds of animals. Even when
imitation probably does not occur through a `rational' process of analysis, the proclivity
to imitate may be well attuned to costs and benets through the guidance of natural
selection. We will use the word imitation broadly to include sub-rational mechanisms
that induce an individual to be inuenced by the behavior of another individual to
behave the same way.
There is an extensive literature in both psychology and zoology on imitation in
many animal species, both in the wild and experimentally (see, e.g., Gibson and Hoglund
(1992), (Giraldeau (1997), and Dugatkin (1992)). Imitation has been documented among
birds, sh, and mammals in foraging and diet choices, selection of mates, selection of
territories, and in means of avoiding predators. Indeed, Blackmore (1999) (e.g., pp.
74-81) suggests that in early hominids there was strong selection for ability to imitate
innovative, complex behaviors, so that the evolution of large brain size was linked to the
rise of the propensity to imitate. Starting within an hour of birth, humans also engage
in imitation. There is also contagion in the emotions of individuals interacting as groups
(see, e.g., Barsade (2001)).
An individual is said to be in an informational cascade if, based upon his observation
of others (e.g., their actions, outcomes, or words), his selected action does not depend on
his private information signal (see Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992), Welch
(1992) and Banerjee (1992) [Banerjee uses the term `herd' for what we refer to here as
a cascade]). In such a situation, his action choice is uninformative to later observers.
Thus, cascades tend to be associated with information blockages. Such blockages are
an aspect of an informational externality: an individual making a choice may do so for
private purposes with little regard to the potential information benet to others.
Gale (1996) reviews models of social learning and herding in general..For an ex-
position and description of applications of informational cascades, see Bikhchandani,
Hirshleifer, and Welch (1998); Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (2001) provides an
annotated bibliography of research relating to cascades.
Returning to Figure 1, rectangles depict the payo interaction hierarchy (I, II, III),
which provides a dierent (though not mutually exclusive) perspective on herding or
dispersing. These include:
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 I. Herding/Dispersing (as in the information hierarchy)
 II. Payo and Network Externalities This involves convergence or divergence of
behavior arising from the fact that an individual's action aects the payos to
others of taking that action. The classic model of herding as a direct payo
interaction is Hamilton's ((1971)) analysis of the geometry of the `selsh herd,'
wherein the clumping of prey animals is an indirect outcome of the selsh attempt
by each one to put others between itself and predators. In nancial economics, the
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) bank run model involves a direct payo externality,
and the Admati and Peiderer (1988) theory of volume clumping involves payo
interactions induced by the incentive for uninformed investors to try to trade with
each other instead of with the informed.
 III. Reputational Herding and Dispersion
This is convergence or divergence of behavior based on the attempt of an individual
to maintain a good reputation with another observer. Such a desire for good
reputation can cause payo interactions, making III a subset of II (see Scharfstein
and Stein (1990), Rajan (1994), Trueman (1994), Brandenburger and Polak (1996),
and Zwiebel (1995).) Ottaviani and Sorenson (2000) explore the relation between
reputational herding and informational cascades.
3 Basic Principles and Alternative Economic Sce-
narios in Rational Learning Models
3.1 Some Basic Principles
We begin by describing further some features of the basic informational cascades model,
which provides a simple way to illustrate some principles common to models of rational
observational learning (item C) as well as those unique to the cascades setting. The
occurrence of an informational cascade can even lead to a complete information blockage.
Consider a sequence of ex ante identical individuals who face similar choices, observe
conditionally independent and identically distributed private information signals, and
who observe the actions but not the payos of predecessors. Suppose that individual i
is in a cascade, and that later individuals understand this. Then individual i+1, having
gained no information by observing the choice of i, is, informationally, in a position
identical to that of i. So i + 1 will also make the same choice regardless of his private
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signal. By induction, this reasoning extends to all later individuals- the accumulation
of information comes to a screeching halt once a cascade begins.
The conclusion that information is blocked forever is of course too extreme, for
several reasons. First, a publicly observable shock can dislodge a cascade. Second,
if individuals are not ex ante identical, then the arrival of an individual with deviant
information or preferences can dislodge a cascade. Third, the occurrence of a cascade
requires that individual do not receive an arbitrarily precise signal- likelihood ratios must
be nitely bounded (on all these items, see, e.g., Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch
(1992)). Fourth, whatever choice is xed upon in the cascades, if payo outcomes from
that choice eventually work their way into the public information pool, cascades can be
dislodged.
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Thus, the more plausible implication to be drawn from the basic cascades
model is just that information aggregation can be unduly slow relative to what could
in principle be attained; and that blockages can occur which may last for signicant
periods of time (see, e.g., the discussion of Gale (1996)).
A generalization of the cascades concept is what can be called a behavioral coars-
ening. This is any situation in which an individual takes the same action for multiple
signal values. In such a situation his information is not fully conveyed by his actions to
observers. Behavioral coarsening leads to partial information blockage. A cascade is the
extreme case in which the coarsening covers all possible signal values, so that blockage
is complete.
The poor aggregation of information in informational cascades of course means that
decisions will also be poor, even if the signals possessed by numerous individuals could
in principle be aggregated to determine the right decision with virtual certainty. Since
the model is fully rational, individuals understand perfectly well that the precision of
the public pool of information implicit in predecessors' actions is quite modest. As a
result, even a rather small public shock can cause a longstanding and popular action to
switch.
Although the arrival of enough public information will improve decisions, the ar-
rival of a signal public disclosure may, paradoxically, make decisions worse. Additional
information can encourage individuals to fall into a cascade sooner, aggregating the in-
formation of fewer individuals, so there is no presumption that the signal will improve
decisions in the cascade (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992)). For similar rea-
sons, the ability of individuals to observe past actions with low noise instead of high
noise, or the ability to observe payo outcomes in addition to past actions, can make
2
However, bad cascades need not be dislodged with certainty; see Cao and Hirshleifer (2000).
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decisions worse on average (Cao and Hirshleifer (1997, 2000))- \a little knowledge is a
dangerous thing."
3
In a real investment context, the assumption of the basic cascades model that the
timing and order of moves is exogenously given is unrealistic. When individuals have a
choice of whether to delay, there can be long periods with no investment, followed by
sudden spasms in which the adoption of the project by one rm triggers the exercise of
the investment option by many other rms (Chamley and Gale (1994)).
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Most of the ideas described above can be generalized to models of social learning
in which cascades do not occur. Even when information blockage is not complete,
information aggregation is limited by the fact that individuals privately optimize rather
than taking into account their eects upon the public information pool. In particular,
there is a general tendency for information aggregation to be self-limiting. At rst,
when the public pool of information is very uninformative, actions are highly sensitive
to private signals, so actions add a lot of information to the public pool. (The addition
can be directly through observation of past actions, or indirectly through observation
of consequences of past actions, as in public payo information that results from new
experimentation on dierent choice alternatives.) As the public pool of information
grows, individuals' actions become less sensitive to private signals.
The loss of sensitivity of actions to private signals can occur suddenly, with a switch
from full usage of private signals to no usage of private signals (as in Banerjee (1992),
and the binary example of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992)). It can occur
gradually (as in the more general cascades model with multiple signal values), yet still
reach a point of complete blockage (as in Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992)).
Or, it can occur gradually but never reach a point of complete blockage. For example, it
can occur that there is always a probability that individuals use their own signals, but
where that probability asymptotes toward zero; this leads to `limit cascades' (Smith and
Sorenson (2000)). Alternatively, there can be cascades proper, but owing to observability
of project payos, there can be a probability less than one that the cascade evenetually
breaks (see Cao and Hirshleifer (2000)). Or, if there is some sort of observation noise, the
public pool of information can grow steadily but more and more slowly (Vives (1993).
In sum, whether information channels become quickly or only gradually clogged,
3
Also, the ability to learn by observing predecessors can make the decisions of followers noisier by
reducing their incentives to collect (perhaps more accurate) information themselves (Cao and Hirshleifer
(1997)).
4
See also Hendricks and Kovenock (1989), Bhattacharya, Chatterjee, and Samuelson (1986), Zhang
(1997) and Grenadier (1999).
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and whether the blockage is complete or partial, is dependent on the economic setting;
but the general conclusion that there can be long periods in which individuals herd
upon poor decisions is robust. Also in general there tends to be too much copying or
behavioral convergence; someone who uses his own private information heavily provides
a positive externality to followers, who can draw inferences from his action..
The cascade outcome described by Banerjee (1992) or Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer,
and Welch (1992) is based on the public pool of information dominating the individual's
private signal. Obviously, this cannot occur with certainty if the private signal likelihood
ratios are unbounded. However, the growth of the public information pool may be
excruciatingly slow, so even in settings where people occasionally observe extremely
informative signals a cascades model can be a good approximation. In particular, as the
public pool of information grows more informative, the likelihood that an individual will
depart from it substantially based on an extreme signal becomes very small.
Thus, the cascades and some other rational learning theories have several general
implications:
 idiosyncrasy (poor information aggregation). Behavior resulting from signals of
just rst few individuals drastically aects behavior of numerous followers.
 fragility (fads). When cascades form, there is complete blockage of information
aggregation, sensitivity to small shocks. As in Hollywood adventure movies, it is
inevitable that the car will end up teetering precariously at the very edge of the
precipice.
 Simultaneity (delay followed by sudden joint action). Endogenous order of moves,
heterogeneous preferences and precisions can exacerbate these problems so that
sudden `chain reactions,' `stampedes' or `avalanches' occur.
 Paradoxicality (greater public information, or greater observability of the actions
or payos of others does not necessarily improve welfare or even the accuracy of
decisions).
 Path dependence (outcomes depend on the order of moves and information arrival).
This implication is shared with models with payo interdependence (e.g., Arthur
(1989)).
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3.2 Alternative Economic Settings
We now describe in somewhat more detail alternative sets of assumptions in observa-
tional inuence models and the implications of these dierences.
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3.2.1 Observation of Past Actions Only
Here we retain the assumption of the basic cascade model that only past actions are
observable, but consider the a variety of model variations.
1. Discrete, Bounded, or gapped actions vs. continuous unbounded actions
If the action space is continuous, unbounded, and without gaps, then an individual's
action is always at least slightly sensitive to his private signal. Thus, actions always
remain informative, and informational cascade never form. Thus, informational cascade
require some discreteness, boundedness or gaps (Lee (1993); see also Vives (1993) and
Gul and Lundholm (1995)). The earliest cascade models were based upon discreteness
(as in Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992), Welch (1992)) or on the equivalent
of a binary action space (Banerjee (1992)).
The assumption of discreteness is in many settings highly plausible. We vote for one
candidate or another, not for a weighted average of the two. Often alternative investment
projects are mutually exclusive. Although the amount invested is often continuous, if
there is a xed cost the option of not investing at all is discretely dierent from positive
investment.
More broadly, one way in which the action set can be bounded is if there is a minimum
and maximum feasible project scale. If so, then when the public information pool is
suÆciently favorable a cascades at the maximum scale will form, and when the public
information pool is suÆciently adverse individuals will cascades upon the minimum
scale. Since there is always an option to reject a new project, investment has a natural
extreme action of zero. Chari and Kehoe (2000) provide a model where a lower bound
of zero on a continuous investment choice creates cascade.
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Similarly, gaps can create cascades. For example, it may be that signicant new
investment or signicant disinvestment is feasible, but owing to xed costs a very small
change is clearly unprotable. If so, then cascades upon no action is feasible if private
5
We do not review the growing literature on how rates of learning vary during macroeconomic
uctuations and how this can contribute to booms and crashes in levels of investment (see, e.g., Gonzalez
(1997), Chalkley and Lee (1998), Chamley (1999), Veldkamp (2000)).
6
Asymmetry between adoption and rejection of projects is often realistic and has been incorporated
in several social learning models of investment to generate interesting eects.
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signals are not too informative.
Even if the true action space is continuous, ungapped and unbounded, to the extent
that observers are unable to perceive or recall small fractional dierences, the actions of
their predecessors eectively become either noisy or discrete. Discretizing can potentially
cause cascades and information blockage; noise similarly slows down learning. There
must be at least some eective discreteness or noise because real observers have nite
perceptual and cognitive powers. At some point, it is literally physically impossible
for an observer to perceive arbitrarily small dierences in actions. Even if perception
were perfect, it would also be impossible, in the absence of innite time and calculating
capacity, to make use of arbitrarily small observed dierences in actions. Thus, for
fundamental reasons there must be either noise, perceptual/analytic discretizing, or
both.
7
If perceptual discretizing is very ne-graded, the outcome will still be very close to
full revelation. However, it is doubtful that perception and analysis is consistently ne-
graded; consider, for example, the tendency for people to round o numbers in memory
and conversation. Kahn, Pennacchi, and Sopranzetti (2002) nd clustering for retail
deposit interest rates around integers, and provide evidence that is supportive of their
model in which this is caused by limited recall of investors.
2. Costless versus costly private information acquisition
Individuals may observe private signals costlessly in the ordinary course of life, or may
expend resources to obtain signals. Most social learning models take the costless route.
Costs of obtaining signals can lead to little accumulation of information in the social
pool for essentially the same reason as in other cascades or herding models. Individuals
have less incentive to investigate or observe private signals if the primary benet of
using such signals is the information that such use will confer upon later individuals.
(Burguet and Vives (2000) analyze social learning with investigation costs). Indeed, if
an individual reaches a situation where he optimally would not make use of a signal,
then clearly it does not pay for him to expend resources to obtain it. The outcome is
similar to that of the basic cascades model: information blockage.
This suggests an extended denition of cascades that can apply to situations where
private signals are costly to obtain. An investigative cascade is a situation where either:
7
In the absence of discretizing, repeated copying will gradually accumulate noise until the information
contained in a distant past action is overwhelmed. This overwhelming of analog signals by noise when
there is sequential replication is the reason that information must be digitized in the genetic code of
DNA, and in information that is sent (with repeated reamplication of signals) over the internet.
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1. An individual acts without regard to his private signal; or,
2. The individual chooses not to acquire a costly signal, but he would have acted
without regard to that signal if he were forced to acquire the same level of signal
precision that he would have acquired voluntarily if he were unable to observe the
actions or payos of others.
Calvo and Mendoza (2001) study the decisions by individuals to investigate and
invest in dierent countries. If investigation of each country requires a xed cost, they
nd that the optimal amount of investigation of a country diminishes rapidly with the
number of countries, leading to greater herding.
3. Observation of all past actions versus a subset or statistical summary of actions
Instead of observing all past actions, it may be that people can observe only the most
recent actions, a random sample, or can only observe the behavior of their neighbors.
Some models with these features are discussed elsewhere; we note here that in such
settings mistaken cascades can still form. Alternatively, individuals may only be able
to observe a statistical summary of past actions. Information blockage and cascades are
possible in such a setting as well (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992)). (With
continuous actions, as discussed above, the outcome may be slow information aggregation
rather than cascade; Vives (1993).) A possible application is to the purchase of consumer
products. Aggregate sales gures for a product matter to future buyers because it
reveals how previous buyers viewed desirability of alternative products (Bikhchandani,
Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992), Caminal and Vives (1999)).
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3. Observation of past actions accurately or with noise
In most social learning models any actions that are observed at all are observed
accurately, but in some there is noise (see Vives (1993), Cao and Hirshleifer (1997)).
Under special circumstances a model in which individuals learn from price is in eect
a basic social leaerning model with indirect observation of a noisy statistical summary
of the past trades of others. But in general a market price scenario is more complex;
the consequence for an individual of taking an action is not just an exogenous payo
function, but the result of an equilibrating process.
4. Choice of timing of moves versus exogenous moves
8
A SmithKline Beecham advertisement states, \Doctors have already endorsed Tagamet in the
strongest possible way. With their prescription pads." The add shows a bar graph in three-dimensional
perspective in which 237 million prescriptions tower above a modest 36 million for Pepcid. A miniscule
footnote reveals that the Tagamet gure was since 1977, Pepcid only since 1986!
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Chamley and Gale (1994) oer a model of irreversible investment in which individuals
with private signals about project quality have a choice as to whether to invest or delay.
This is therefore a model of optimal option exercise. They nd that in equilibrium there
is delay. The advantage of delay is that an individual can gain information by observing
the actions of others. But if everyone were to wait, there would be no advantage to
delay. Thus, in equilibrium investors follow randomized strategies in deciding how long
to delay before being the rst to invest. Investment by an individual can trigger imme-
diate further investment by others. Indeed, in the limit a period of little investment is
followed by either a sudden surge in investment or a collapse. Thus, the model illustrates
simultaneity). In equilibrium cascades occur and information is aggregated ineÆciently.
Zhang (1997) oers a setting in which investors have private information not only
about project quality, but about the precision of their signals. In the unique symmetric
equilibrium, among investors with favorable signals, those whose signals are less precise
delay longer than those with more precise signals (because imprecise investors have
greater need for corroborating information before investing). In equilibrium there is
delay until the critical investment date of the individual who drew the highest precision
is reached. Once he invests, other investors all immediately follow, though investment
may be ineÆcient. This sudden onset of investment illustrates simultaneity in an extreme
form.
Chamley (2001) nds that when individuals have dierent prior beliefs, there are
multiple equilibria that generate dierent amounts of public information. Chari and
Kehoe (2000) show that when there is a binary decision of whether or not to invest, but
an endogenous choice of timing, consistent with Chamley and Gale (1994) and Zhang
(1997), ineÆcient cascades still occur. They nd that even when there is a continuous
level of investment bounded below by zero, an ineÆcient cascade on zero investment can
occur (for reasons discussed earlier). They also nd that cascades remain even when
individuals have the opportunity to share information, because individuals do not have
an incentive to communicate truthfully.
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A number of other models describe how information blockages, delays in investment
and periods of sudden investment changes, and overshooting can occur, either with
(Caplin and Leahy (1994), Grenadier (1999)) or without (Caplin and Leahy (1993),
Persons and Warther (1997)) informational cascades. Caplin and Leahy (1994) analyze
informational cascades in the cancellation of investment projects in a setting with en-
9
Gul and Lundholm (1995) examine a model that allows for delay in which a continuous action space
leads to full revelation and therefore no cascades.
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dogenous timing. They nd that that there can be sudden crashes in the investments
of many rms triggered by individual cancellations. These models share the broad intu-
itions that informational externalities cause choices about whether and when to invest
to be taken in a way that is undesirable from a social point of view.
Persons and Warther (1997) oer a model of boom and bust in the adoption of
nancial innovations based upon observation of the payos resulting from the repeated
actions of other rms. They nd a tendency for innovations to `end in disappointment'
even though all participants are fully rational; a natural consequence of learning is that
the boom continues to grow until disappointing news appears. Zeira (1999) develops
related notions of informational overshooting to real estate and stock markets.
5. Presence of an evolving publicly observable state variable
Grenadier (1999) examines informational cascades in options exercise, in which an
exogenously evolving publicly observable state variable inuences the incentives to ex-
ercise the option. A small recent move in the state variable can be the `straw that broke
the camel's back' in triggering informational cascades of option exercise. Grenadier
suggests several applications, such as \the building of an oÆce building, the drilling of
an exploratory oil well, and the commitment of a pharmaceutical company toward the
research of a new drug."
6. Stable versus stochastic hidden environmental variable
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) provide an example where the underly-
ing state of the world is stochastic but unobservable. This can lead to fads wherein the
probability that action changes is much higher than the probability of a change in the
state of the world.
Perktold (1996) assumes a Markov process on the value of the choice alternatives,
and individuals make repeated decisions over time. He nds that cascades occur and
break recurrently. Moscarini et al (1998) examine how long cascades can last as the
environment shifts. Nelson (2001) explores the relation between high correlation of in-
dividual actions and cascades. She oers a model of IPOs in which the decision to
go public is more likely to be associated with informational cascades than the decision
to hold o.
10
Hirshleifer and Welch (2002) consider an individual or rms subject to
10
Nelson also points out that care is needed in the testing of herding and cascades models if the
proxy used is correlation of behavior. She shows that there is often a lower correlation of behavior in a
setting with cascades than in a setting where all the information is made public. This is because public
information induces high correlation in actions: people converge to the right action. On the other hand,
if the benchmark for comparison is one where each individual's information remains private, herding
and cascades will be associated with higher correlation of action. So it is still reasonable in testing
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memory loss about past signals but not actions. They describe the determinants (such
as environmental volatility) of whether memory loss causes inertia (a higher probabil-
ity of continuing past actions than if memory were perfect) or impulsiveness (a lower
probability).
7. Homogeneous versus heterogeneous payos
Individuals have dierent preferences, though this is probably more important in
non-nancial settings. Suppose that dierent individuals value adoption dierently. A
rather extreme case is opposing preferences or payos, so that under full information
two individuals would prefer opposite behaviors. If each individual's type is observable,
dierent types may cascades upon opposite actions.
However, if the type of each individual is only privately known, and if preferences
are negatively correlated, then learning may be confounded| individuals do not know
what to infer from the mix of preceding actions they observe, so they simply follow their
own signals (Smith and Sorenson (2000)).
8. Endogenous cost of action: market models with price
This is a large topic that we cover separately below.
9. Single or repeated actions and private information arrival
Most models with private information involve a single irreversible action, and a single
arrival of private information. In Chari and Kehoe (2000), in each period one investor
receives a private signal, and investors have a timing choice as to when to commit to
an irreversible investment. In equilibrium there are ineÆcient cascade. If individuals
take repeated, similar, actions and continue to receive non-negligible additional informa-
tion, actions will of course become very accurate. However, there can still be short-run
ineÆciencies (e.g., Hirshleifer and Welch (2002).
10. Discrete signal values versus continuous signal values
Depending on probability distributions, possible to get limit cascades (Smith and
Sorenson (2000)) instead of cascades. As commented by Gale (1996), the empirical
signicance is much the same|information aggregation can be poor large periods of
time.
11. Exogenous rules versus endogenous contracts and institutional structure
Some papers that examine how the design of institutional rules and of compensation
contracts aects herding and informational cascades in project choice include Prender-
gast (1993), Khanna (1997), and Khanna and Slezak (2000) (discussed below); see also
such models to examine behavioral convergence. But a fuller test of such models would look examine
whether high convergence in behavior is achieved without high accuracy of decisions.
15
Ottaviani and Sorenson (2001).
3.2.2 Observation of Consequences of Past Actions
Vicarious learning is so powerful that one might expect that observing past payos would
eliminate information blockages and lead to convergence upon correct actions. Indeed,
in an imperfectly rational setting, Banerjee and Fudenberg (1999) nd convergence to
eÆcient outcomes if people sample at least two predecessors. On the other hand, as em-
phasized by Shiller (2000a), in practice imperfect rationality makes conversation a very
imperfect aggregator of information. This suggests that biases induced by conversation
may be important for stock market behavior.
Even under full rationality, it should be noted that the Banerjee/Fudenberg setting
always leaves a rich inventory of information to draw from. In each period a continuum
of individuals try all choice alternatives, so there is always a pocket of information
available about the payo outcome of either project. Cao and Hirshleifer (2000) examine
a setting that is closer to the basic cascades model. There are two alternative project
choices, each of which has an unknown value-state. Payos are in general stochastic
each period conditional on the value-state. Individuals receive private signals and act in
sequence, and individuals can observe all past actions and project payos. Nevertheless,
idiosyncratic cascades still form. For example, a sequence of early individuals may
cascade upon project A, and its payos may become visible to all, perhaps revealing the
value-state perfectly. But since the payos of alternative B are still hidden, B may be
the superior project. Indeed, the ability to observe past payos can sometimes trigger
cascades even more quickly-an indication of parodoxicality.
Caplin and Leahy (1993) examine a setting where potential industry entrants learn
indirectly from the actions of previous entrants by observing industry market prices.
Entrants do not possess any private information prior to entry. Imperfect information
slows the adjustment of investment to sectoral economic shocks. (On the informational
and action consequences of rms observing past payos, see also Persons and Warther
(1997) discussed earlier.)
3.3 Imperfectly Rational Individuals
So far we have focused primarily on fully rational models. Some models that assume
either mechanistic or imperfectly rational decisionmakers include Ellison and Fudenberg
(1993, 1995) (rules of thumb), Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman (1994) (`hubris'
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about the ability to obtain information quickly), Bernardo and Welch (2001) (overcon-
dence), Hirshleifer and Noah (1999) (mists of several sorts), Hirshleifer and Welch
(2002) (memory loss about past signals),
In the rules of thumb approach the behavior of agents is specied based on analytical
convenience, or on the researcher's judgment that the rule of thumb or heuristic would be
a reasonable one for agents with limited cognitive powers to follow. The other approach is
to draw on experimental psychology to suggest assumptions about imperfect rationality
of agents in the model. Both approaches have merit, but for both, verication of the
behavioral assumptions is desirable. In particular, even behavioral assumptions that are
based broadly upon psychological evidence are usually not based upon experiments that
are very close to the particular economic setting being modeled.
In Smallwood and Conlisk (1979), choices are based on payos received, and on
market share of the choice alternatives. Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) specify that an
individual takes an action if all individuals in the sample are using it, or if they obtained
a higher average payo using the action than the alternative. In Ellison and Fudenberg
(1993), decisions are based upon past payos from a sample of observations from past
adoptions, and based upon the market shares of choice alternatives.
If individuals use a diversity of decision rules (whether rational, quasi-rational, or
simple rules of thumb), then there will be greater diversity of action after a cascade
among rational individuals starts. This action diversity can be informative, and can
break cascades (Bernardo and Welch (2001), Hirshleifer and Noah (1999)). This im-
proves the eÆciency of the choices of rational individuals in the long run.
There are many other possible directions to take imperfect rationality and social
learning. Evidence of emotional contagion within groups suggests that there may be
merit to the popular views about contagious manias or fads (see also Shiller (2000b),Lynch
(2000), and Lux (1995)). On the other hand, some historically famous bubbles, such as
that if the Dutch Tulip Bulbs, may have reected information rationally and fully (see,
e.g., Garber (2000)). Furthermore, there are rational models of bubbles and crashes that
do not involve herding (see, e.g., the agency/intermediation model of Allen and Gale
(2000a), and the review of Brunnermeier (2001)).
We argue elsewhere that limits to investor attention are important for nancial re-
porting and capital markets (see the review of Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2002), and
the model of Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2001)). Such limits to attention may pressure
individuals to herd or cascade despite the availability of a rich set of public and private
information signals (beyond past actions of other individuals). A related issue is whether
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the tendency to herd or cascade greater when the private information that individuals
receive is hard to process (cognitive constraints and the use of heuristics for hard de-
cision problems were emphasized by Simon (1955); in the context of social inuence,
see Conlisk (1996)). In this regard, Kim and Pantzalis (2000) provide evidence that
apparent herd behavior by analysts is greater for diversied rms, for which the task
that analysts face is more diÆcult.
11
DiÆculty in analyzing opaque accounting reports has been widely raised in the press
as a source of the recent Enron debacle. In testimony to the House of Representatives on
December 12, 2001, the Director of Thompson/First Call indicated that when analysts
can not disentangle a rm's accounting there, tends to be greater herding in analyst
forecasts (i.e., smaller dispersion in forecasts) than is the case for the average S&P 500
rm.
3.4 Market Prices, Herding, and Informational Cascades
If markets are perfect and investors are rational, then risk-adjusted security returns
are unpredictable. We will refer to this combination of conditions- full rationality and
perfect markets- as `classical.' By perfect markets we mean that each investors trades
as if he can buy or sell any amount at a given market price. Thus, even though a
rational expectations model such as that of Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) has information
asymmetry, since individuals perceive that they can trade at a given price, we view this
as a perfect market. Furthermore, in a classical market there is neither an excess nor
a shortfall in price volatility relative to public news arrival about fundamental value
(where we include as `public' even information that was originally private but which can
be rationally inferred by observing market prices or trading) . It follows immediately
that fully rational models of cascades or herding cannot explain anomalous evidence
regarding return predictability or excess volatility (for recent reviews of theory and
evidence relating to investor psychology in capital markets, see, e.g., Hirshleifer (2001),
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2002)).
This is not to deny that information blockages and herding may aect prices. What
this does show is that to explain return patterns that are anomalous from the classical
viewpoint, it is necessary to introduce either market imperfections or failures of human
11
Some physicists and mathematicians have oered heavily-engineered models of mechanistic agents
to examine the relation of herd behavior to price distributions (see, e.g., Cont and Bouchaud (1999)). An
early analysis of direct preference for conformity was provided by Kuran (1989), but the informational
implications have not been fully explored.
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rationality.
Even within a fully rational setting, cascades or herding can have the serious eect
of blocking information aggregation. The properties of return unpredictability, and of
correct volatility in a classical market are relative to the information that can be inferred
from publicly observable variables including market prices and volumes. However, the
existence of cascades can aect how much information goes into that information set in
two ways. First, it can cause some information to remain private which otherwise would
be reected in and inferable from prices and trades. Second, it can cause individuals
to change their investigation behavior, potentially reducing the amount of private and
public information that is generated in the rst place.
Vives (1995) analyzes the rate of learning in competitive securities markets. The
intuition is similar to the intuition in herding models with exogenous action costs. An
informed trader does not internalize the benet that other traders have from learning
his private information as revealed through trading. Thus, the rate of convergence of
price to eÆciency is slow.
In Glosten and Milgrom (1985), even though the action space is discrete, there are
no informational cascades. This fact has stimulated some analysis of how endogeneity
of prices can act to prevent cascades. In simple trading settings, cascades cannot occur
(see Avery and Zemsky (1998)). Intuitively, cascade would contradict market clearing.
Securities prices should aggregate private information through trading. If there were a
cascade where informed traders were buying regardless of their signals, then a fortiori
so would uninformed traders. If the optimal response to even an adverse signal is to
buy, then so is the reponse to having no signal. But if, foreseeably, both informed and
uninformed are trying to buy, the marketmaker ought to have set prices dierently.
However, if there are multiple dimensions of uncertainty, then something akin to a
cascades can occur. It is standard to assume that informed investors know more than
the market maker about the expected payo of the security. Avery and Zemsky intro-
duce a second informational advantage to informed investors over the market maker{
uncertainty over whether informative signals were sent. In consequence, a price rise
can encourage an investor with an adverse signal to buy when there is a transaction
cost or bid-ask spread. The price rise persuades the investor that others possess fa-
vorable information, whereas the market maker adjusts prices sluggishly in response to
this good news. This relative sluggishness of the marketmaker arises from his igno-
rance over whether an informative signal was sent. Informed traders-even those with
adverse signals-at least know that information signals were sent, so that the previous
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order probably came from a favorably informed trader. In contrast, the market maker
places greater weight on the possibility of a liquidity trade.
The behavior described by Avery and Zemsky is very cascade-like, in that the individ-
ual is acting in opposition to his private signal- a rather extreme behavioral coarsening.
However, it is in fact not a true informational cascade. When no information signal
is received, the investor takes a dierent action from when information is received. So
there are really three possible signal realizations-favorable, unfavorable, and no signal.
Action is in fact dependent on this appropriately redened signal. In any case, this
pseudo-cascading phenomenon leads to partial information blockage.
It is worth noting that in a dierent setting, true cascades may indeed occur. Suppose
that A is sometimes informed, when A is informed B is aware that A is informed, but
C is not informed and does not know when others are informed. As usual there is also
non-information-based (`liquidity') trading. Then there would seem to be a benet to B
of imitating A's trade, and for C to take up the slack.
Gervais (1996) nds information blockage owing to bid-ask spreads. In his model,
there is uncertainty about investors' information precision. Trading occurs over many
periods yet trader private information is not incorporated into price. Informed investors
receive a signal and know the precision of the signal, but the market-maker does not.
Initially a high bid-ask spread acts as a lter by deterring trade by informed investors
unless they have high precision. However, as the market-maker observes whether trade
occurs, he is able to update about signal precision and about the value of the asset.
Owing to his increased knowledge over time the market-maker narrows the spread. This
narrowing causes even investors with imprecise signals to trade, so eventually the market-
maker stops learning about investors' information precision. This independence of the
decision to trade from the private information about precision is a behavioral coarsening,
and causes this type of information to remain forever private.
Cipriani and Guarino (2001a) extend Glosten/Milgrom to a multiple security setting.
They allow for traders that have non-speculative motives for trading. In Cipriani and
Guarino, the trading of informed investors causes information to be partly reected in
price. As prices become more informative, at some point one more of the conditionally
independent private signals causes a rather small update in expected fundamental value.
As a result, an investor who has a non-speculative reason to purchase the security nds
it protable to purchase the security even if his private information signal is adverse.
In other words, he is in a cascade. Similarly, investors who have a non-speculative
motive to sell do so regardless of their signal. With all informed investors in a cascade,
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further aggregation of information is completely blocked. Thus, in contrast to Avery and
Zemsky, informational cascades proper form. Furthermore, cascades lead to contagion
across markets.
In Lee (1998) there are quasi-cascades that result in temporary information blockage,
then avalanches. This arises from transactions costs and discreteness in trades, which
lead to behavioral coarsening. In sequential trading, hidden information becomes accu-
mulated as the market reaches a point at which, owing to transactions costs, trading
temporarily ceases. Eventually a large amount of private information can be revealed
by a small triggering event. The triggering event is a rare, low probability adverse sig-
nal realization. An individual who draws this signal value sells. Other individuals who
observe this sale are drawn into the market, causing a market crash or `avalanche.'
These papers apply a sequential trading approach. Beaudry and Gonzalez (2000)
apply a rational expectations (simultaneous trading) modeling approach to show that
cascading occurs when information is costly to acquire, leading to price and investment
uctuations. Like these other papers, investment is a discrete decision.
12
A key issue regarding the occurrence of information blockage in these models is the
signicance of the assumption of discrete actions. Any model that attempts to explain
empirical phenomena such as market crashes as (quasi-)cascades must calibrate with
respect to the size of minimum trade size or price movements. Such constraints are
most likely to be signicant for illiquid markets.
13
Perhaps the more important role of cascades is likely to be in the decision of whether
or not to participate at all, rather than in the decision of whether to buy or sell. If
there is a xed cost (perhaps psychic) of participating, then there can be a substantial
discreteness to individual decisions that does not rely in any way upon limiting the size
of trades to a single unit. Or, if people are imperfectly rational, so that there is some
sort of barrier to their participating, again there can be cascades of participation versus
non-participation.
In the context of risk regulation, Kuran and Sunstein (1999) develop the notion
of availability cascades; their ideas are applicable to security market activity. If high
publicity about a rm or market theory makes the rm more salient and `available'
12
Chakrabarti and Roll (1997) oer a simulation analysis of the eects of investors learning by ob-
serving the trades of others. They report that under some market conditions learning by observing
others reduces market volatility and in others increases volatility.
13
In a short run level, the expectation that NYSE specialists will maintain an `orderly market' by
keeping prices continuous can potentially force temporary deviations of prices from market values, block
information ow. This suggests a relevance of cascade only in extreme circumstances.
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to investors. This may encourage cascades of investment (Huberman (1999) provides
evidence and insightful discussion about the eect of familiarity on investment). Local
biases in investment (see, e.g., Coval and Moskowitz (2001)), and the home bias puzzle of
international nance (see, e.g., Tesar and Werner (1995), Lewis (1999)) may be examples
of availability cascades. In any case cascades in market participation oer a rich avenue
for further analytical exploration.
There is starting to be some exploration of the formation and clearing of information
blockages associated with the choice of individuals over time as to whether or not to
participate in trading (Romer (1993), Lee (1998), Cao, Coval, and Hirshleifer (2001),
and Hong and Stein (2001)). In settings with limited participation, large crashes can be
triggered by minimal information, and the sidelining and entry of investors can cause
skewness and volatility to vary conditional upon past price moves. (Bulow and Klem-
perer (1994) consider a dierent setting with asymmetric revelatory eects of trading.)
4 Agency/Reputation-Based Herding Models
In the seminal paper on reputation and herd behavior, Scharfstein and Stein (1990)
consider two managers face identical binary investment choices. Managers may have
high or low ability, but neither they nor outside observers know which. Observers infer
the ability of managers from whether their investment choices are identical or opposite,
and then update based upon observing investment payos. Managers are paid according
to observers' assessment of their abilities. It is assumed that high ability managers will
observe identical signals about the investment project, whereas low ability managers
observe independent noise.
There is a herding equilibrium in which the rst manager makes the choice that his
signal indicates, whereas the second manager always imitates this action regardless of
his own signal. If the second manager were to follow his own signal, observers would
correctly infer that his signal diered from the rst manager, and as a result they would
infer that both managers are probably of low quality. In contrast, if he takes the same
choice as the rst manager, even if the outcome is poor, observers conclude that there
is a fairly good chance that both managers are high quality and that the bad outcome
occurred by chance. Thus, their model captures the insight of John Maynard Keynes
that \it is better to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally."
Rajan (1994) considers the incentive for banks with private information about bor-
rowers to manage earnings upward by relaxing their credit standards for loans, and by
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refraining from setting aside loan-loss reserves. When there is a bad aggregate state
of the world, even the loans of high ability managers do poorly. Thus, observers do
not `punish' a banker reputationally as much for setting aside loan-loss reserves if other
banks are doing so as well. Thus, the set-aside of reserves by one bank triggers set-
asides by other banks. This simultaneity in the actions of banks is somewhat analogous
to the delay and sudden onset of informational cascades in the models Zhang (1997)
and Chamley and Gale (1994). Furthermore, Rajan shows that banks tighten credit in
response to declines in the quality of the borrower pool. Thus banks amplify shocks to
fundamentals. Rajan provides evidence from New England banks in the 1990s of such
delay in increasing loan loss reserves, followed by sudden simultaneous action.
Trueman (1994) considers the reputational incentives for stock market analysts to
herd in their forecasts of future earnings. We cover this paper in the next section.
One of his ndings is that analysts have an incentive to make forecasts biased toward
the market's prior expectation. In a similar spirit, Brandenburger and Polak (1996)
show that a rm with superior information can have a reputational incentive to make
investment decisions consistent with the prior belief that observers have about which
project choice is more protable. Intuitively, even if the prior-disfavored project choice
is the more protable of the two alternatives and even if observers assume that the
manager will make the prot-maximizing choice, the market may still be disappointed
that the prior-favored choice was not the more protable of the alternatives. This
can occur, for example, if the likely driver of selection of the prior-disfavored choice
is disappointing information about the prior-favored alternative. Where these papers
focus on pleasing investors, Prendergast (1993) examines the incentives for subordinate
managers to make recommendations consistent with the prior beliefs of their superiors.
Where in Scharfstein and Stein it is better to fail as part of the herd than to succeed
as a deviant, Zwiebel (1995) describes a scenario in which it is always best to succeed,
but where the fact that a manager's success is measured relative to others sometimes
causes herding. The rst premise of the model is that there are common components of
uncertainty about managerial ability. As a result, observers exploit relative performance
of managers to draw inferences about dierences in ability. The second premise is that
managers are averse to the risk of being exposed as having low ability (perhaps because
the risk of ring is nonlinear). For a manager who follows the standard behavior, the
industry benchmark can quite accurately lter out the common uncertainty. This makes
following the industry benchmark more attractive for a fairly good manager than a poor
one, even if the innovative project stochastically dominates the standard project. The
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alternative of choosing a deviant or innovative project is highly risky in the sense that
it creates a possibility that the manager will do very poorly relative to the benchmark.
Thus, the model oers an alternative explanation for corporate conservatism to the
herd-free reputational models of Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) and Prendergast and
Stole (1996), and the memory-loss approach of Hirshleifer and Welch (2002).
However, in Zwiebel's model a very good manager can be highly condent of beating
the industry benchmark even if he chooses a risky, innovative project. If this project is
superior, it pays for him to deviate. Thus, intermediate quality managers herd, whereas
very good or very poor managers deviate. Zwiebel's approach is suggestive that under
some circumstances portfolio managers may herd by reducing the risk of their portfolios
relative to a stock market or other index benchmark, but under others may intentionally
deviate from the benchmark. Several papers pursue these and related issues such as
optimal contracting in detail (see, e.g., Maug and Naik (1996), Gumbel (1998), Huddart
(1999), and Hvide (2001)). Sciubba (2001) provides a model of herding by portfolio
managers in relation to past performance. Brennan (1993) analyzes the asset pricing
implications of such index-herding behavior.
In some models a principal designs institutions and/or compensation schemes in the
face of managerial incentives to engage in informational cascades or making choices
to match an observer's priors (Prendergast (1993) [discussed above], Khanna (1997),
Khanna and Slezak (2000)). Khanna (1997) examines the optimal compensation scheme
when managers have incentives to cascade in their investment decisions. He examines
a setting in which the managers of competitor rms can investigate to generate private
signals. A manager may delay investigation in the expectation of gleaning information
more cheaply by observing the behavior of the competitor. A manager may also observe
a signal but cascade upon the action of an earlier manager. Khanna describes opti-
mal contracts that address the incentives to investigate and to cascade, and develops
implications for compensation and investments across dierent industries.
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Khanna and Slezak (2000) provide an intra-rm model in which the tendency for
cascades to start among managers reduces the quality of project recommendations and
choices. This is a disadvantage of `team decisions,' in which managers make decisions
sequentially and observe each others' recommendations. Incentive contracts that elimi-
nate cascades may be too costly to be desirable for the shareholders. A hub-and-spokes
hierarchical structure where managers independently report recommendations to a su-
14
See also Grant, King, and Polak (1996) for a review of informational externalities in a corporate
context when there are share price incentives.
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perior eliminates cascades, but requires superiors to incur costs of monitor subordinates
to ensure that subordinates do not communicate. Thus, under dierent conditions the
optimal organizational form can be either teams or hierarchy.
5 Herd Behavior and Cascades in the Analysis of
Securities
5.1 Herd Behavior in Investigation and Trading
In an informational cascades setting where individuals have to pay a cost to obtain their
private signals, once a cascades starts individuals have no reason to investigate. In secu-
rity market settings, the assumption that the aggregate variance of noise trading is large
enough to inuence prices non-negligibly (as in the seminal paper of DeLong, Shleifer,
Summers, and Waldmann (1990) and subsequent models of exogenous noise) implicitly
reects an assumption that individuals are irrationally correlated in their trades. This
could be a result of herding (which involves interaction between the individuals), or
merely a common irrational inuence of some noisy variable on individuals' trades.
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The analysis of Brennan (1990) was seminal in illustrating the possibility of herd
behavior in the analysis of securities. He provided an overlapping generations model in
which private information about a security is not necessarily reected in market price the
next period. This occurs in a given period only if a pre-specied number of individuals
had acquired the signal. Thus, the benet to an investor of acquiring information about
an asset can be low if no other investor acquires the information. However, if a group of
investors coordinate to acquire information than the investors who obtain information
rst do well. Since the setting is special it has stimulated further work to see if herding
can occur in settings with greater resemblance to standard models of security trading
and price determination.
Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992) oer a model that endogenizes price determina-
tion more fully. In their setting, investors with exogenous short horizons nd it protable
to herd by investigating the same stock. In so doing they are, indirectly able to eect
what amounts to a tacit manipulation strategy. When they buy together the price is
driven up, and then they sell together at the high price. Thus, herding even on `noise'
(a spurious uninformative signal) is protable.
15
Golec (1997) provides a possible example of such a common irrational inuence. He calls this
`herding on noise,' one of our two possible interpretations.
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However, even in the absence of opportunities for herding there is a potential in-
centive for individuals, acting on their own, to eect such manipulation strategies. If
individuals are allowed to trade to `arbitrage' such manipulation opportunities, it is not
clear that such opportunities can in equilibrium persist. This raises the question of
whether there are incentives for herding per se rather than for herding as an indirect
means of manipulation.
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Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman (1994) examine the security analysis and
trading decisions of risk averse individuals, where investigation of a security leads some
individuals to receive information before others. They nd a tendency toward herding.
The presence of investigators who receive information late confers an obvious benet
upon those who receive information early- the late informed drive the price in a direction
favorable to the early-informed. But by the same token, the early-informed push the
price in a direction unfavorable to the late-informed. The key to the model's herding
result is that the presence of the late-informed allows the early-informed to unwind their
positions sooner. This allows the early-informed to reduce the extraneous risk they would
have to bear if, in order to prot on their information, they had to hold their positions
for longer. This risk-reduction that the late-informed confer upon the early informed
is a genuine ex ante net benet- it is not purely at the expense of the late informed.
Overcondence about the ability to become informed early further encourages herding
in this model; each investor expects to come out the winner in the competition to study
the `hot' stocks.
Holden and Subrahmanyam (1996) show that there can also be herding in the choice
of whether to study short-term or long-term information about the stock. Intuitively,
exploiting long-term information again involves the bearing of more extraneous risk,
which can be costly.
5.2 Herd Behavior by Stock Analysts and other Forecasters
Several studies of forecasters have reported herding or herding-like ndings. Ashiya and
Doi (2001) report that Japanese macro-economic forecasters herd in their forecasts, re-
gardless of their age. Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996) nd, consistent with psychological
bias rather than rational reputational-oriented bias, that economic forecasters bias their
forecasts in directions characteristic of high mean-squared-error forecasters. However,
16
Another interesting question is whether short horizons can be derived endogenously. Dow and
Gorton (1994) nd that owing to the risk of trading on long-term information, prices will not fully
reect private information.
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the analytical literature on stock market analysts has focused on rational reputational
reasons for bias.
Analyst earnings forecasts are biased, as documented by Givoly and Lakonishok
(1984), Brown, Foster, and Noreen (1985), and many more recent authors. Forecasts
are generally optimistic in the U.S. and other countries, especially at horizons longer
than one year (see e.g. Capsta, Paudyal, and Rees (1998) and Brown (2001)). More
recent evidence indicates that analysts' forecasts have become pessimistic at horizons of
3 months or less before the earnings announcement (Brown (2001), Matsumoto (2001)
and Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki (2001)).
Stickel (1992) nds that the compensation received by analysts is related to its rank-
ing in a poll by Institutional Investor about the best analysts. Furthermore, forecasts
by members of Institutional Investor's of `All-American Research Team' were more ac-
curate than those of non- members. These ndings suggests that analysts may have an
incentive to adjust their forecasts to maintain good reputations for high accuracy.
Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1999) nd that analysts whose forecasts are less ac-
curate than peers are more likely to turn over. This importance of relative evaluation
supports the premise of reputational models of herding. However, they nd no relation
between either absolute or relative protability of an analyst's recommendations and
probability of turnover. Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000) nd evidence suggesting
that there are reputational incentives for analyst herding. Less experienced analysts are
more likely to be terminated for `bold' forecasts that deviate from the consensus forecast
than are experienced ones, suggesting that the pressure to build reputation is strongest
for analysts for which uncertainty about ability is greatest.
Trueman (1994) provide a model in which analysts tend to issue forecasts that are
biased toward prior earnings expectations, and also herd in the sense that forecasts are
biased toward those announced by previous analysts. In his analysis, an analyst has a
greater tendency to herd if he is less skillful at predicting earnings-it is less costly to
sacrice a poor signal than a good one.
Stickel (1990) nds that changes in consensus analyst forecasts are positively related
to subsequent revisions in analyst's forecasts, apparently consistent with herd behavior.
This relationship is weaker for the high-precision analysts who are members of the `team'
than for analysts who are not. Thus, it appears that members of the `team' are less prone
to herding than non-members. This is consistent with the prediction of the Trueman
model.
Experimental evidence involving experienced professional stock analysts has also
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supported the model (Cote and Sanders (1997)). Cote and Sanders report that these
forecasters exhibited herding behavior. Furthermore, the amount of herding was related
to the forecasters' perception of their own abilities and their motivation to preserve or
create their reputations.
In contrast, Zitzewitz (2001) provides a methodology for estimating the degree of
herding versus exaggeration of dierences (the opposite of herding) by analysts. He
reports that in fact analysts on average exaggerate their dierences. He also nds that
analysts under-update their forecasts in response to public information, indicating an
overweighting of prior private information. This evidence opposes the conclusion that
analysts on the whole herd. It is potentially supportive of reputational models in which
some individuals intentionally diverge (e.g., Prendergast and Stole (1996)), or with over-
condence on the part of analysts in their private signals.
It is also often alleged that analysts herd in their choice of what stocks to follow.
There is very high variation in analyst coverage of dierent rms Bhushan (1989). In
his sample, the average number of analysts following a rm was approximately 14, but
a number of rms were followed by only 1 analyst; the maximum number of analysts
was 77. This is not inconsistent with herding by analysts in their coverage decisions,
and indirectly by the investors that listen to them. But in the absence of any rst-best
benchmark for the dispersion of analyst following across rms, it is hard to draw any
conclusion on this issue
There are also allegations that analysts herd in their stock recommendations. This
issue is studied by Welch (2000), who nds that revisions in the buy and sell stock
recommendations of a security analyst are positively related to revisions in the buy and
sell recommendations of the next two analysts. He traces this inuence to short-term
information, identied by examination of the ability of the revision to predict subsequent
returns.
17
Welch also nds that analysts' choices are correlated with the prevailing consensus
forecast. Welch further nds that the `inuence' of the consensus on later analysts is not
stronger when it is a better predictor of subsequent stock returns. In other words, the
evidence is consistent with analysts herding even upon consensus forecasts that aggregate
information poorly. This is consistent with agency eects such as reputational herding,
or could reect imperfect rationality on the part of analysts. Finally, Welch nds an
asymmetry, that the tendency to herd is stronger when recent returns have been positive
17
This could reect cascading, or could be a clustering eect wherein the analysts commonly respond
to a common, independently observed signal.
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(`good times') and when the consensus is optimistic. He speculates that this could lead
to greater fragility during stock market booms, and the occurrence of crashes.
The evidence on the recommendations of investment newsletters on herding is mixed.
Jae and Mahoney (1999) report only weak evidence of herding by newsletters in their
recommendations over 1980-96. However, Graham (1999) develops and tests an explicit
reputation-based model of the recommendations of investment news letters, in the spirit
of Scharfstein and Stein (1990). He nds that analysts with better private information
are less likely to herd on the market leader, Value Line investment survey. This nding is
consistent with the models of Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer,
and Welch (1992).
6 Herd Behavior and Cascades in Security Trading
Some sociologists have emphasized that the `weak ties' of liaison individuals, who connect
partly-separated social networks, are important for spreading behaviors across networks
(Granovetter (1973). A recent literature in economics has examined the strength of
peer-group eects in a number of dierent contexts (see, e.g., Weinberg, Reagan, and
Yankow (2000), and the survey of Glaeser and Scheinkman (2000)). In a capital mar-
kets context, Shiller and Pound (1989) nd based on questionnaire/survey evidence that
word-of-mouth communications are reported to be important for the trading decisions
of both individual and institutional investors. Two recent studies report that employees
are inuenced by the choices of coworkers in their decisions of whether to participate
in dierent employer-sponsored retirement plans ((Duo and Saez 2000), Madrian and
Shea (2000)). Kelly and O'Grada (2000) and Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2001) provide
further evidence that social interactions between individuals aects decisions about eq-
uity participation and other nancial decisions. A theoretical analysis of learning from
neighbors is provided by Bala and Goyal (1998).
6.1 The Endorsement Eect
According to informational cascades theory, endorsements can be extremely inuential
if the endorser has a reputation for accuracy, and if the endorsement involves an actual
informative action by the expert. This could take the form of knowing that the expert
took a similar action (buying a stock), but could also involve the expert investing his
reputation in the stock by recommending it.
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The choice by a big-ve auditor, top-rank investment bank, or venture capital to
invest its reputation in certifying a rm inuences investor favorably toward the rm.
18
Furthermore, just as shopping mall developers use `anchor' stores to attract other stores,
according to McGee (1997) some IPO underwriters have been using the names of well-
known investors as `anchors' to attract other investors.
19
There are many examples of inuential investors, some more benign than others. In a
story entitled \Pied Piper of Biotech Keeps Followers Happy with Cut-Rate Stock," the
Wall Street Journal, 5/7/92 says \Wherever David Belch invests his money , a crowd
of stockbrokers and money managers is sure to follow. `David Blech is the single most
important force in the biotech industry,' says Richard Bock, a stockbroker... I follow
whatever stock he goes into, knowing it will be a success.' "
Some investors are inuenced in cold-calls by brokers by statements that famous
investors are holding a stock (see Lohse (1998) on \Tricks of the Trade: `Buett is Buying
This' and other Sayings of the Cold-Call Crew"). (Since Buett is typically a passive
investor, his inuence reects perceptions that he is well informed rather than that he
will reorganize the rm.) One investment digest explicitly gave as its key reasoning for
spotlighting a stock the fact that Buett was involved in it (Davis (1991)).
When news came out that Warren Buett had bought approximately 20% of the 1997
world silver output, according to The Economist (1998) silver prices were sent \soaring."
When Warren Buett's lings reporting his increased shareholding in American Express
and in PNC Bank became public, these shares rose by 4.3% and 3.6% respectively
(Obrien and Murray (1995)).
According to Sandler and Raghavan (1996), \Whether Warren Buett has been
right or wrong about a stock, investors don't like to see him get out if they're still in.
Some investors in Saloman are focusing almost entirely on the famed Omaha, Neb.,
18
See the models of Titman and Trueman (1986), and Datar, Feltham, and Hughes (1991), and the
evidence of Beatty and Ritter (1986), Booth and Smith (1986), Johnson and Miller (1988), Beatty
(1989), Carter and Manaster (1990), Feltham, Hughes, and Simunic (1991), Simunic (1991), Megginson
and Weiss (1991), Michaely and Shaw (1995), and Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998). A salient recent
example of this certication eect is the drop of 36% in the shares of Emex when First Boston denied
Emex's claim that it was their investment banker (Remond and Hennessey (2001)).
19
\As any fashion house knows, stitching a designer label on a pair of jeans allows it to charge two or
three times the going rate for pants. Now, battling to set themselves apart from the crowd, and entice
more investors to their initial public oerings of stock, edgling technology companies with unproven
products and no earnings are bragging of their ties to stock-market winners like Microsoft Corp., Cisco
Systems Inc. or American Online Inc. Never mind that some of these anchor investors don't appear
to be picky; they invest in bunches of smaller companies because they know that not every investment
will pan out. The fact is, the hype works..." The article gives several examples in which tech stock
analysts and investors may have been inuenced by the cachet of anchor investors.
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multibillionaire's decision, announced Sept. 12, ..." to convert Salomon preferred shares
into common shares instead of taking cash.
Investing human capital is also form of endorsement; for example, when it was an-
nounced that John Scully was signing on as chairman and CEO of the little known
rm Spectrum Information Technologies Inc., its stock jumped by close to 46%.
20
The
inuence of stock market `gurus' is a sort of endorsement, but in some cases investors
seem irrationally inuenced by well-known but incompetent analysts. This may involve
a limited attention/availability eect wherein investors use an analyst's visibility fame
as an indicator of ability. A would-be guru can exploit the aws of this heuristic by using
even outlandish publicity stunts to gain notoriety; see, e.g., the description of Joseph
Granville's career in Shiller (2000b).
Stock prices react to the news of the trades of insiders; see, e.g., Givoly and Palmaon
(1985). It seems clear that these trades provide information to market participants,
who adjust their own trading (as a function of price) accordingly. Such inuence on the
part of insiders potentially gives them the power to manipulate prices, as reected in the
analysis of Fishman and Hagerty (1995); see Fried (1998) for a discussion of the `copycat
theory' that insiders exploit imitators by trading in the absence of private information.
Investors are also inuenced by private conversations with peers. For example, Fung
and Hsieh (1999) state that \a great deal of hedge fund investment decisions are still
based on \recommendations from a reliable source.' " There is also evidence that in-
vestors are inuenced by implicit endorsements, as with default settings for contributions
in 401(k) plans; see Madrian and Shea (2000).
6.2 A Challenge in Measuring Herding
An important challenge to empirical work on herding is to rule out clustering. Some
external factor could be independently inuencing dierent investors' trades in parallel,
even if there were no interaction between the trades of the dierent investors in the
alleged herd. In general it is hard to rule out clustering conclusively, though a few
studies are able to do so in specic contexts. One method of addressing this is to
include proxies for possible variables that may jointly aect the behavior of dierent
individuals (for a general analysis of econometric issues in measuring social interaction,
see, e.g., Brock and Durlauf (2000)). Of course, no matter how thorough the study, it
20
Wall Street Journal, 10/14/93, \Sculley Becomes Chief of Spectrum, Placing Bet on Wireless Tech-
nology", John J. Keller)." A later Business Week investigation suggested that the CEO of Spectrum
was \a manipulator who duped John Sculley and milked the company" (Schroeder (1994)).
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is always conceivable that some joint causal factor has been omitted.
Some studies go further to examine natural or articial experiments which rule out
the possibility of an omitted inuence. Sacerdote (2001) provides evidence of peer eects
in a study of roommate choices with random assignments, so avoids this. Also, a growing
literature starting with Anderson and Holt (1996) has conrmed learning by observing
actions, and the existence of informational cascades in the experimental laboratory (see
also Hung and Plott (2001), Anderson (2001), Sgroi (2000) and Celen and Kariv (2001)).
Consistent with cascades, Dugatkin and Godin (1992) nd experimentally that female
guppies tend to reverse their mate choices when they observe other females choosing
dierent males.
The simultaneous causation issue is present in most herding tests, but becomes more
tricky in nancial market tests because of the inuence of price. It is possible for
individuals to herd in a conditional fashion, dependent upon past price movements.
However, even if we rule out all non-price joint causal eects, correlation in trades
conditional upon price movements is not necessarily herding. For example, suppose
that certain mutual funds have correlated trades that are associated with past price
movements. This could indicate herding. On the other hand, it could be that some
other group of investors such as individual investors is herding, and that the mutual
funds are not. The mutual funds may merely be adjusting their trades in response
to price movements. In the extreme, if there are only two groups of traders, then by
market clearing, herding by one group of traders automatically implies correlation in the
trades of the other group, even though there may be no interaction whatsoever between
members of this other group.
Alternatively, it could be that some group of investors is jointly inuenced by some
unobserved inuence, and again that the mutual funds are jointly responding to price.
Once again, the correlation in the trades of the mutual funds does not imply herding.
Thus, to verify that a group is truly herding, it is crucial either to control for price, or if
not, to verify whether the causality of the behavioral convergence is really coming from
the group in question or from other traders.
6.3 Evidence Regarding Herding in Trades
Several papers on institutional investors trading have developed alternative measures
of trading; see, e.g., Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992), Grinblatt, Titman, and
Wermers (1995), Wermers (1999). Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) critically review
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alternative empirical measures of herding.
GriÆths et al (1998) nd increased similarity of behavior in successive trades for
securities that are traded in an open outcry market rather than a system trading market)
on the Toronto stock exchange, consistent with the possibility of imitation-trading raised
by the evidence of Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995). Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000))
provide evidence consistent with herding by individuals and institutions.
Institutional investors constitute a large fraction of all investors. By market-clearing
it is impossible for all investors to be buyers or sellers. Although testing for herding by
such a large group is not unreasonable, it certainly makes sense in addition to examine
ner subdivisions of investors. In older studies, Friend, Blume, and Crockett (1970)
found, during a quarter in 1968, a tendency for mutual funds to follow the investment
decisions made in the previous quarter by successful funds. Kraus and Stoll (1972)
found that in a sample of mutual funds and bank trusts from 1968-9 attribute the
large trade imbalances they nd in stocks to chance rather than correlated trading.
Klemkosky (1977) found that in 1963-72 that stocks bought by investment companies
(mainly mutual funds) subsequently do well.
Using quarterly data on the portfolios of pension funds from 1985-89, Lakonishok,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) nd relatively weak evidence that pension funds engage
in either positive feedback trading or herding, with a stronger eect in smaller stocks.
Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) nd that most stock mutual funds purchased
past winners during 1974-84. They nd a tendency for funds to buy and sell stocks
at the same time in stocks in which a large number of funds are active. Herding was
strongest among aggressive growth, growth and income funds. Wermers (1999) nds
that during 1975-94 there was little herding by mutual funds in the average stock, but
that there was herding in small stocks and in stocks that experienced high returns.
Growth-oriented mutual funds tended to herd in their trades. He also found superior
performance among the stocks that herds buy relative to those they sell during the six
months subsequent to trades, especially among small stocks. Nofsinger and Sias (1999)
report that changes in institutional ownership are associated with high contemporaneous
stock and returns, that institutions tend to buy after positive momentum, and that the
stocks institutions buy outperform those that they sell. On a shorter time scale, Kodres
and Pritsker (1997) report herding in daily trading by large futures market institutional
traders such as broker-dealers, banks, and hedge funds, although measurement issues
create signicant challenges
Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997) nd that fund
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managers that are doing well lock in their gains toward end of the year by indexing the
market, whereas funds that are doing poorly deviate from the benchmark in order to try
to overtake it. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) indentify possible compensation incentives
for younger managers to herd by investing in popular sectors, and nd empirically that
younger managers choose portfolios that are more `conventional' and which have lower
non-systematic risk.
6.4 Creditor Runs, Bank Runs, and Financial Contagion
An older literature argued that bank runs are due to `mob psychology' or `mass hysteria'
(see the references discussed in Gorton (1988)). At some point economists may revisit
the role of emotions in causing bank runs or `panics,' and more generally causing multiple
creditors to refuse to nance distressed rms. Such an analysis will require attending to
evidence from psychology about how emotions aect judgments and behavior
At this point the main models of bank runs and of nancial distress are based upon
full rationality (for reviews of models and evidence about bank runs, see, e.g., Calomiris
and Gorton (1991) and Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) section 5.2) . There is a
negative payo externality in which withdrawal by one depositor, or the refusal of a
creditor to renegotiate a loan, reduces the expected payos of others. This can lead
to multiple equilibria involving runs on the bank or rm, or to bank runs triggered by
random shocks to withdrawals (see, e.g., Diamond and Dybvig (1983)). This of course
does not preclude the possibility that there is also an informational externality.
The informational hypothesis (e.g., Gorton (1985)) holds that bank runs result from
information that depositors receive about the condition of banks' assets. When a dis-
tressed rm seeks to renegotiate its debt, the refusal of one creditor may make others
more skeptical. Similarly, if some bank depositors withdraw their funds from a troubled
bank, others may infer that those who withdrew had adverse information about the value
of the bank's illiquid assets, leading to a bank run (see, e.g., Chari and Jagannathan
(1988), Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988)).
Bank runs can be modeled as informational cascades, since the decision to withdraw
is bounded (the individual cannot withdraw more than 100% of his deposit). There is a
payo as well as an informational interaction: early withdrawals hurt loyal depositors,
and more generally refusal of a creditor to renegotiate hurts other creditors. However,
at the very start of the run, when only a few creditors have withdrawn, the main eect
may be the informational conveyed by the withdrawals rather than the reduction in the
34
bank's liquidity.
If assets are imperfectly correlated, cascades can pass contagiously between banks and
cause mistaken runs even in banks that could have remained sound; (on information and
contagion, see Gorton (1988), Chen (1999), and Allen and Gale (2000b)). This suggests
that the arrival of adverse public information can trigger runs (see, e.g., Calomiris and
Gorton (1991))
There is evidence of geographical contagion between bank failures or loan-loss reserve
announcements and the returns on other banks (see Aharony and Swary (1996) and
Docking, Hirschey, and Jones (1997)). This suggests that bank runs are triggered by
information rather than being a purely non-informational (multiple equilibria, or eects
of random withdrawal) phenomenon.
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Saunders and Wilson (1996) provide evidence of
contagion eects in a sample of U.S. bank failures during the period 1930-32. On the
other hand Calomiris and Mason (1997) nd that the failure of banks during the Chicago
panic of June 1932 was due to common shocks, and Calomiris and Mason (2001) nd
that banking problems during the great depression can be explained based upon either
bank-specic variables or publicly observable national and regional variables rather than
contagion.
6.5 Exploiting Herding and Cascades
Firms often market experience goods by oering low introductory prices. In cascades
theory, the low price induces early adoptions, which helps start a positive cascade. Welch
(1992) developed this idea to explain why initial public oerings of equity are on average
severely underpriced by issuing rms.
22
Neeman and Orosel (1999) provide a model of
auctions in a winner's curse setting in which a seller (such as a rm selling assets) can
gain from approaching potential buyers sequentially, inducing informational cascades,
rather than conducting an English auction.
21
There is also evidence of contagion in speculative attacks on national currencies (Eichengreen, Rose,
and Wyplosz (1996)).
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An example is provided by the description of the Microsoft IPO in Fortune (1986) (p. 32): \Eric
Dobkin, 43, the partner in charge of common stock oerings at Goldman Sachs, felt queasy about
Microsoft's counterproposal. For an hour he tussled with Gaudette, using every argument he could
muster. Coming out $1 too high would drive o some high-quality investors. Just a few signicant
defections could lead other investors to think the oering was losing its luster." This illustrates the use
of price to induce cascades, and the result of the cascades model that individuals with high information
precision are particularly eective at triggering early cascades.
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7 Herding, Bubbles, and Crashes: The Price Impli-
cations of Herding and Cascading
Popular allegations of securities market irrationality often emphasize the contagiousness
of emotions such as panic or frenzy. Critics often go on to argue that this causes excess
volatility, destabilizes markets, and makes nancial system fragile (see, e.g., the critical
review of Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) and references therein). There is indeed
evidence that emotions are contagious and that this contagion aects perceptions and
behavior (see, e.g., Hateld, Cacioppo, and Rapson (1993), Barsade (2001)). In the
classic fully rational models of securities market price formation, information is conveyed
through prices or pricing functions that are observable to all, so there is no room for
localization in the contagion process (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Kyle (1985)). Even
recent models of herding and of informational cascades in securities markets involve
contagion based upon observation of either market prices or trades, again leaving little
room for localization.
On the other hand, the evidence discussed in Section 6 suggests that social inter-
actions between individuals aects nancial decisions. This suggests that the social or
geographical localization of information may be an important part of the process by
which trading behaviors spread. Furthermore, some sociologists and economists argue
that there are threshold eects in social processes, where the adoption of a belief or
behavior by a critical number of individuals leads to a tipping in favor of one behavior
versus another (Granovetter (1978), Schelling (1978), Kuran (1989, 1998)).
Thus, an important direction for further empirical research is to examine how whether
a localized process of contagion of beliefs and attitudes aects stock markets (see, e.g.,
Shiller (2000a)), and whether securities market price patterns are consistent with rational
models of contagion. An important theoretical direction is to examine the implications
for securities market trading and prices of conversation between individuals; see the
analysis of DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2000), and the concluding discussion of
Cao, Coval, and Hirshleifer (2001).
If herding is driven by agency considerations, one would expect any price eects of
herding to be driven by institutional investors. Sias and Starks (1997) provide evidence
that institutional investors are a source of positive portfolio return serial correlations
(both own-and cross correlations of the securities held by institutions). Aitken (1998)
nds that the autocorrelation of the returns of emerging stock markets increased sharply
at the time that institutional investors were expanding their positions in emerging mar-
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kets. He argues that this indicates that this reected the eect of uctuating sentiment
by institutional investors.
23
There is a large and growing literature on contagion between the debt or equity
markets of dierent nations (see, e.g., Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001)). Borensztein
and Gelos (2001) report moderate herding in the trades of emerging market mutual
funds during 1996-9, but was not stronger during crises than normal times. With regard
to price eects of herding, there are some large correlations in returns, but it is hard
to measure whether this is an eect of herding, and there is only mixed evidence as to
whether correlations are higher during nancial crises. Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999) pro-
vide strong evidence of herding by foreign investors before the 1996-7 period of economic
crisis for Korea, but herding was actually lower during the crisis period. Furthermore,
they do not nd any indication that trades by foreign investors had a destabilizing eect
on Korea's stock market. Many studies have examined how the occurrence of a crisis
in one country aects the probability of crisis in another country; see, e.g., Berg and
Pattillo (1999) for a review of this research.
Experimental asset markets have been found to be capable of aggregating a great
deal of the private information of participants; however, in complex environments the
literature has shown that blockages form so that imperfect information aggregation is
imperfect (see, e.g., Noeth et al (2002), Bloomeld (1996), and the surveys of Libby,
Bloomeld, and Nelson (2001), Sunder (1995)). Experimental laboratory research pro-
vides a very promising direction for exploring the relationship of herding to market
crashes (see, e.g., Cipriani and Guarino (2001b)). These should provide the raw mate-
rial for new theorizing on this topic.
Gompers and Lerner (2000) provide evidence of `money chasing deals' in venture
capital. Inows into venture capital funds are associated with higher valuations of the
new investments made by these funds, but not with the ultimate success of the rms.
Thus, it seems that correlated enthusiasm of investors for certain kinds of investors
moves prices for non-fundamental reasons. However, Froot, O'Connell, and Seasholes
(2001) nd that portfolio ows in and out of 44 countries during 1994-98 were positive
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Christie and Huang (1995) are unable to detect `herd behavior,' in the sense of high cross-sectional
standard deviations of security returns at the time of large price movements. Rather than measuring
herd behavior (social inuence) per se, this is an indirect measure of the tendency for some group of
investors to react in a common way more at the time of extreme shocks than at other times. However, it
is not obvious what the fundamental benchmark should be for the association between large shocks and
idiosyncratic variability; see also Chang, Cheng, and Khorana (2000), who report that in the U.S. and
several asian markets, there is relatively little evidence of herding except for the two emerging markets
in the sample; and Richards (1999).
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forecasters of future equity returns, with statistical signicance in emerging markets.
8 Herd Behavior and Cascades in Firms' Investment,
Financing, and Reporting Decisions
It is often alleged in the popular press that managers are foolishly prone to fads in
management methods (for examples and formal analysis see Strang and Macy (2001))
investment choices, and reporting methods.
Managers learn by observing the actions and performance of other managers, both
within and across rms. This suggests that rms will engage in herding and be subject
to informational cascades, leading to management fads in accounting, nancing and in-
vestment decisions. The popularity of dierent investment valuation methods, securities
to issue, and so on have certainly waxed and waned. There are booms and quiet periods
in new issues of equity that are related to past stock market returns and to the past
average initial returns from buying an IPO (see, e.g., Ibbotson, Ritter, and Sindelar
(1994), Eckbo and Masulis (1995) and Lowry and Schwert (2002)). However, it is not
easy to prove that uctuations in investments and strategies result from irrationality,
rational but imperfect aggregation of private information signals, or direct responses to
uctuations in public observables.
Takeover markets have been subject to seemingly idiosyncratic booms and crashes,
such as the wave of conglomerate mergers in the 1960's and 70's, in which rms diversi-
ed across dierent industries, the subsequent refocusing of rms through restructuring
and bustup takeovers in the 1980's, followed by the merger boom of the 1990s. Pur-
chase of another rm: targets of a takeover bid are `put into play,' and often quickly
receive competing oers, despite the negative cost externality of having a competitor.
Haunschild (1993) provides interesting evidence about apparent informational contagion
of the decision to engage in a takeover. In her 1981-90 sample, a rm was more likely
to merge if one of its top managers was a director of another rm that had engaged in
a merger during the preceding three years.
Several papers have attempted to measure herd behavior in investment decisions.
Jain and Gupta (1987) report only weak evidence of herding in loans to LDC's by US
banks. D'Arcy and Oh (1997) study cascades in the decisions of insurers to underwrite
risks and the pricing of insurances. Foresi, Hamo, and Mei (1998) provide evidence
consistent with imitation in the investment decisions of Japanese rms.
Is there a more general tendency toward strategic imitation? Gilbert and Lieberman
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(1987) examined the relation amongst the investments of 24 chemical products over two
decades. They found that larger rms in an industry tend to invest when their rivals
do not. In contrast, smaller rms tend to be followers in investment. This behavior is
consistent with a `fashion leader' version of the cascades model in which the small free-
ride informationally on the large (where large rms may have greater absolute benet
from acquiring precise information, or scale cost economies in information acquisition).
Survey evidence on Japanese rms indicates that a factor that encourages rms to engage
in direct investment in an emerging economy in Asia is whether other rms are investing
in that country. This is consistent with possible cascading based upon a manager's
perception that rival rms possess useful private information about the desirability of
such investment (Kinoshita and Mody (2001)). Greve (1998) provide evidence of rm
imitation in the choice of new radio formats in the U.S.
Chaudhuri, Chang, and Jayaratne (1997) examine spatial clustering of bank branches
in cities. They point out that banks are likely to have imperfect information about the
potential protability of opening a branch in a particular neighborhood. They show
that a bank's decision to open a new branch in a census tract of New York City during
1990-95 depended on the number of existing branches in that tract. They use tract-
level crime statistics land-use data, and socioeconomic data to control for expected
tract protability. They conclude that there is a positive incremental relation between
a bank's decision to open a new branch and the presence of other banks' branches,
consistent with information-based imitation.
Analogous to the endorsment eect in indivdual investor trading are endorsement
eects in real investments. Real estate investment is a prime area of application for
cascades/endorsement eects, because the investment decisions are discrete and con-
spicuous (Caplin and Leahy (1998) analyze real estate herding/cascading).
24
Economists have long studied agglomeration economies as an explanation for ge-
ographical concentration of investment and economic activity (e.g., Marshall (1920),
Krugman and Venables (1995, 1996)). Such eects are surely important. However,
as pointed out by DeCoster and Strange (1993), geographical concentration can occur
without agglomeration economies owing to learning by observation of others: `spuri-
ous agglomeration.' Empirically some papers use previous investment by other rms
24
For example, consider Bianco (1996) in Business Week entitled: \A Star is Reborn: Investors hustle
to land parts in Times Square's transformation." The article states of Disney that \Its agreement to
revamp the New Amsterdam Theater, a Beaux Arts gem, was like waving a magic wand: Wait-and-see
investors piled in." After long delay, the transformation of New York's Times Square was triggered by
an investment by Disney, after which \wait-and-see investors piled in," an illustration of simultaneity.
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in a location as a proxy for agglomeration economies in predicting investment by other
rms (e.g., Head, Ries and Swenson (1995, 2000)). Barry, Gorg, and Strobl (2001)
empirically test between aggregation economies and what they call the \demonstration
eects," whereby a rm locates in a host country because the presence of other rms
there provides information about the attractiveness of the host country. They conclude
that both agglomeration economies and agglomeration eects are important.
The observation of the payos, not just actions of rivals is clearly important in rms'
investment decisions. For example, after Sara Lee Corp. introduced the fashionable
Wonderbra to the U.S. in New York in May 1995, VF Corporation observed its popularity
and then \surged ahead with a nationwide rollout ve months ahead of Sara Lee..."
(Weber (1995)). Referring to VF's `second-to-the-market' business strategy, Business
Week stated that \Letting others take the lead may be outre at Paris salons, but it's a
winning style at FV."
Reporting and disclosure practices are variable over time; for example, recently it has
been popular for rms to disclose pro forma earnings in ways that dier from the GAAP-
permited denitions on rms' nancial reports. Firms have argued that this allows them
to reect better long-term protability by adjusting for non-recurring items. However,
it is also possible that rms are just herding, or that they are exploiting herd behavior
by investors. At this point the evidence is not clear, though regulators have expressed
concern about this practice.
More generally, in a meta-study of accounting choices, Pincus and Wasley (1994)
report that voluntary accounting changes by rms do not appear to be clustered in
time and industry, suggesting no herding behavior in accounting changes. This result
further indicates, surprisingly, that rms do not switch accounting methods in response
to changes in macro-economic investment conditions that are experienced at about the
same time by similar rms within an industry. Rather, the voluntary accounting changes
would appear to be made in response to rm-specic needs, such as a rm-specic need
to manage earnings.
However, it is not obvious why rms would need to manage earnings in response
to rm-specic circumstances, yet would not want to manage earnings in response to a
common factor shock. One speculative possibility is that there is a concern for relative
performance, as reected in the model of Zwiebel (1995), combined with some deviation
from perfect rationality that causes investors to adjust imperfectly for accounting method
in evaluating rms' earnings.
25
The concern for relative performance may create a
25
For example, Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2002) suggest that owing to limited attention, Hirsh-
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stronger incentive for managers to manage earnings upward when the rm is doing
poorly relative to peers than when the entire industry is doing poorly.
26
9 Conclusion
According to Gertrude Stein (as quoted by Charlie Chaplin), \Nature is commonplace.
Imitation is more interesting." We have described here why imitation is interesting
for capital markets. In our discussion of rational observational learning, we described
some emergent conclusions: idiosyncrasy (mistakes), fragility (fads), simultaneity (delay
followed by sudden joint action), paradoxicality (more information of various sorts can
decrease welfare and decision accuracy), and path dependence. We have explored how
literature on herding, social learnings, and informational cascades can be applied to a
number of investment, nancing, reporting and pricing contexts.
We have also argued that these conclusions are fairly robust in rational social learning
models. Depending on the exact assumptions, informationmay be completely suppressed
for a period (until a cascade is dislodged); under other assumptions, information is
asymptotically revealed, but too slowly. A setting where information arrives too slowly
to be helpful for most individuals' decisions is essentially the same from the point of
view of both welfare and predicting behavior as one where information is completely
blocked for a while. Although cascades require discrete, bounded, or gapped action
space, or cognitive constraints, we have argued that discreteness and boundedness are
highly plausible in some nancial settings. Even when these conditions fail, owing to
noise, the growth in accuracy of the public information pool tends to be self-limiting,
resulting in similar eects.
There are many patterns of convergent behavior and uctuations in capital markets
that do not obviously make immediate sense in terms of traditional economic models,
such as xation on poor projects, stock market crashes, sharp shifts in investment and
unemployment, bank runs. Such behavioral convergence often appears even in the face
of negative payo externalities. Although other factors (such as payo externalities) can
lock in ineÆcient behaviors, the rational social learning theory and especially cascades
theory dier in that they imply pervasive but fragile herd behavior. This occurs be-
leifer, Lim, and Teoh (2001) analyze explicitly how informed parties can adjust their disclosure decisions
to exploit the limited attention of observers.
26
Consistent with this idea, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) provide evidence that the likelihood
of hostile takeover forcing managerial turnover was high for rms underperforming their industry, but
was not high when the industry as a whole was underperforming.
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cause the accumulation of public information slows down or blocks the generation and
revelation of further information. This idiosyncratic feature of cascades and rational
observational learning models cause the social equilibrium to be precarious with respect
to seemingly modest new shocks.
Rational observational learning theory suggests that in many situations, even if pay-
os are independent and people are rational, decisions tend to converge quickly but
tend to be idiosyncratic and fragile. Convergence arises locally or temporally upon a
behavior, and can suddenly shift into convergence on the opposite behavior. The re-
quired assumptions, primarily discreteness or boundedness of possible action choices,
are mild and likely to be present in many realistic setting. This suggests that the eects
of observational learning and herding mentioned in the rst paragraph of this section are
likely to aect behavior in and related to capital markets. This includes both herding
by rms, and actions by rms such as nancing, disclosure and reporting policies that
can potentially be managed to exploit investors that herd. Similarly, perhaps the special
skill that some hedge fund and mutual fund managers seem to have is in exploiting the
herding behavior of imperfectly rational investors.
Models of reputation-based herding do not typically share the fragility feature of
rational observational learning theory. However, reputation-based models have much to
oer in their own right. This includes explanation of those herds that seem stable and
robust. As another example, the reputation approach helps explain dispersion as well as
herding, and when one or the other will occur. Reputation models also oer a rich set
of implications about the extent of herding in relation to characteristics of the agency
problem and the manager.
Most instances herding in capital markets are likely involve mixtures of reputational
eects, informational eects, direct payo interactions, preference eects, and imperfect
rationality. For example, to explain predictability in securities markets, some imperfect
rationality is likely to be needed. Integration of the dierent eects will lead us to better
theories about capital market behavior.
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